ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/15/1
STRABAG SE
Claimant
-v-
LIBYA
Respondent
Partial Dissenting Opinion
1.
I firmly believe that
dissenting opinions should be resorted to only in the event of serious disagreements over matters of principle.
While I fully respect the views of my two distinguished colleagues and value the thoroughness with which our
deliberations have been conducted, I am unable to support their decision on the important issues of advance
payments and set-off described below. I thus respectfully dissent with respect to these issues only.
2.
For the sake of clarity, I
set out below the main facts relevant to the present opinion. These facts are extensively developed in the
Award.
3.
Claimant, Strabag SE, is a
large international construction firm incorporated in Austria. Following the relaxation of international
sanctions against Libya, Claimant saw opportunities for large construction projects in Libya and, through its
wholly owned German subsidiary Strabag International Ltd., secured contracts with the Libyan Roads and Bridges
Authority ("RBA") in 2006 and 2007 for two major road projects in
Benghazi
1 and
Misurata.
2
4.
Following Libya's decision
to require foreign construction firms to carry on their business jointly with a Libyan
partner,
3 Strabag
International Ltd. joined with the Libyan Investment and Development Company ("LIDCO") in 2007 to create a joint
venture company under the name of Al Hani General Construction Co. ("Al
Hani").
4 Claimant
indirectly owns 60% of Al Hani and LIDCO owns the remaining 40%.
5.
In 2009, with the approval
of RBA, Strabag International Ltd. assigned the Benghazi and Misurata contracts to Al
Hani.
5 Al Hani also
entered into several other contracts for construction works in Libya. They included the TIAR contract with RBA
for the reconstruction and upgrading of the Tripoli International Airport
Road,
6 the TIAR-NE
contract with RBA for technical studies and designs for the northern extension of the
Tripoli International Airport
Road,
7 the Garaboulli
contract with the Transportation Projects Board ("TPB") for the maintenance of the coastal road between Ras
Ejdir and Garaboulli and the development and upgrading of the Tripoli Western Access
Road,
8 and the Tajura
contract with the Housing and Infrastructure Board ("HIB") for design and construction work in connection with a
major new urban development in the city of Tajura, a suburb of
Tripoli.
9 The latter was
the largest contract, with an estimated value of over 778 million Libyan Dinars ("LYD").
6.
Article 10(a) of the
Tajura, TIAR, and Garaboulli contracts and Article 2(1) of Appendix B of the TIAR-NE contract provided for an
advance payment to be made to Al Hani by the relevant contractual counterparty on Respondent's side. (Article
10(a) of the Benghazi and Misurata contracts provided for the advance payment to be made to Strabag
International Ltd.) The advance payment constituted part of the total value of the contract and its purpose was
to help Al Hani/Strabag International Ltd. cover the initial costs incurred in starting the project.
7.
In the Benghazi, Misurata,
TIAR, TIAR-NE, and Garaboulli contracts, the advance payment amounted to 15% of the total contract price. In the
Tajura contract, it represented 20% of the contract price.
8.
Because the advance
payments were made under each contract prior to the performance of any works by Strabag International Ltd. (for
the Benaghazi and Misurata contracts) and Al Hani (for the remaining contracts), they were intended to be
recouped through pro rata deductions from Strabag International Ltd.'s/ Al Hani's invoices during the life
of the relevant contract. Strabag International Ltd. or Al Hani, as the case may be, would repay the advance
payments through the deduction of the amount of 15% (or 20% in the case of the Tajura contract) from each
Payment Certificate until the advance payments were repaid in full. Each Payment Certificate required Strabag
International Ltd./Ai Hani to submit proof of works on the specific project.
9.
Each contract required that
the advance payments be guaranteed by unconditional and irrevocable letters of credit obtained by Al Hani (or
Strabag International Ltd. for the Benghazi and Misurata contracts prior to their assignment to Al Hani in 2009)
in favor of the relevant contractual counterparty on Respondent's side, except for the TIAR-NE contract, in
which Article 2(1) of Appendix B merely provided that the advance payment should be paid by RBA to Al Hani "in
exchange for a letter of guarantee in the same amount," without specifying that the letter of guarantee should
be unconditional and
irrevocable.
10
10.
It is undisputed between
the Parties that Strabag International Ltd. (for the Benghazi and Misurata contracts) and Al Hani (for the
remaining contracts) received all the contractually mandated advance payments. The amounts of the advance
payments were, for the Benghazi contract, LYD 4,870,803 and EUR
2,949,640;
11 for the
Misurata contract, LYD
7,419,344;
12 for the
Tajura contract, LYD
155,717,915;
13 for the
TIAR contract, LYD
11,124,958;
14 for the
TIAR-NE contract, LYD
742,500;
15 and for the
Garaboulli contract, LYD
25,903,040.
16
11.
It is also undisputed that
Strabag International Ltd. and Al Hani, directly or through Claimant, provided the contractually required
unconditional and irrevocable advance payment guarantees, in the form of letters of credit, in favor of the
various counterparties on Respondent's side.
12.
It is likewise undisputed
that through the deduction mechanism of Article 10(a), Respondent completely recovered the advance payments on
the Benghazi and Misurata road contracts.
13.
Respondent contends,
however, that Al Hani still holds EUR 98,128,159 in unearned advance payments under the Tajura, TIAR, TIAR-NE,
and Garaboulli
contracts,
17 and that
Al Hani has an obligation to repay those unearned amounts since they pertain to work that was never performed by
Al Hani under the
contracts.
18
14.
Accordingly, Respondent
contends that if the Tribunal determines that any amounts are owed to Al Hani under the contracts, such amounts
should be set off against the unearned amounts of the advance payments.
15.
Claimant, on the other
hand, argues that there are no remaining unearned amounts from the advance payments, since all the advance
payments were applied to work on Al Hani's projects and have been used up. It also expresses concern that some
letters of credit in relation to some of the projects remain a potential liability. Claimant contends that it
would suffer significant prejudice and face "double jeopardy" if the Tribunal were to accept Respondent's
set-off argument and if it then had to honor a call from the banks, which it would be unable to contest as the
bank guarantees are
unconditional.
19
16.
Claimant alleges that
three bank guarantees continue to represent
liabilities
20 for it:
(1) the advance payment guarantee for the Tajura project, Letter of Credit
12293,
21 in an amount
of EUR 51,905,971.53; (2) the performance guarantee for the Tajura project, Letter of Credit
12295,
22 in an amount
of EUR 5,190,597.15; and (3) the performance guarantee for the TIAR project, Letter of Credit
12402,
23 in an amount
of LYD 1,002,747.58.
17.
The advance payment
guarantee for the Tajura project and the performance guarantees for the Tajura and TIAR projects each consisted
of(1) an unconditional and irrevocable "fronting guarantee" in the form of a standby letter of credit from
Gumhouria Bank in Libya in favor of HIB (for the Tajura guarantees) and RBA (for the TIAR performance guarantee)
and (2) a "backing guarantee" in the form of a counter-guarantee letter of credit issued by Claimant's bank,
namely ABC International Bank (for the Tajura guarantees) and Deutsche Bank (for the TIAR performance
guarantee), in favor of Gumhouria Bank. Claimant had to pay fees to ABC International Bank and Deutsche Bank to
maintain the letters of credits.
18.
As for the TIAR advance
payment guarantee and the TIAR-NE and Garaboulli guarantees, Claimant does not seem to consider them a potential
liability as these were provided by Al Hani, not by Claimant
itself.
24
19.
It was Respondent's
understanding in late 2019 that the TIAR, TIAR-NE, and Garaboulli advance payment guarantees were still
valid,
25 and likewise
the TIAR-NE performance
guarantee.
26 With
respect to the Tajura guarantees (for advance payment as well as for performance), Respondent asserts that they
had expired by 2012 and
2013.
27
20.
The majority of the
Tribunal finds that "[t]he testimony at the Hearing and the evidence on record show that significant elements in
the chain of guarantees securing the Tajura advance payment remain in effect, as does the entire TIAR guarantee
and the separate performance guarantees for both of these
Contracts."
28 It
concludes, therefore, that "the guarantees, including at least the Tajura backing guarantee and Strabag's
related obligations to ABC Bank, remain in effect and must be taken into account in assessing the claimed
set-off."
29
21.
The majority's finding
that the Tajura guarantees remain valid is premised on (1) the hearing testimony of Mr. Al Naas, HIB's senior
official responsible for letters of credit, who stated that HIB was contemplating a possible call on the Tajura
guarantees,
30 and (2)
"a substantial body of evidence ... showing that Strabag has for many years paid bank charges to maintain the
Tajura and TIAR advance payment and performance
guarantees."
31
According to the majority, "Claimant presumably did not pay these significant amounts in respect of allegedly
'non-existent'
guarantees."
32
22.
However, the evidence on
the record regarding the Tajura advance payment guarantee in the amount of EUR 51,905,971.53 (by far the most
substantial guarantee) casts serious doubt on its continuing validity. The record shows that both Gumhouria Bank
and ABC International Bank regarded at least the fronting guarantee component of the Tajura advance payment
guarantee as having expired.
23.
According to the very
wording of Letter of Credit 12293, the fronting guarantee was supposed to remain valid until May 31, 2012, after
which date, "and in absence of [HIB] instructions within its validity, it will be automatically considered as
null and void."
33 The
backing guarantee was supposed to be "valid 30 (thirty) days beyond the expiry
date of [the fronting
guarantee]."
34
24.
A Swift communication from
Gumhouria Bank to ABC International Bank dated July 17, 2012, shows that (I) on March 15, 2012, HIB delivered
instructions to Gumhouria Bank to renew the fronting guarantee, but that those instructions were sent to the
wrong branch of Gum houria Bank; (2) on July 5, 2012, ABC International Bank sent a Swift message to Gumhouria
Bank asking to be "release[d]" from the backing guarantee; and (3) on July 17, 2012, Gumhouria Bank requested
ABC International Bank to "reinstate" the guarantee until the end of June
2013.
35
25.
From the foregoing, one
may reasonably infer that ABC International Bank considered the fronting guarantee to have expired given that no
request for extension was made within its validity period. ABC International Bank accordingly asked to be
"release[d]" from the backing guarantee.
26.
The record shows that ABC
International Bank considered the backing guarantee to have expired as well. On December 23, 2015, in response
to a Swift communication from Gumhouria Bank dated November 16, 2015, ABC International Bank stated that "[a]s
advised to you previously,
your standby LC reference ST-BY L/C
12293 [i.e., the fronting
guarantee]
and our counter guarantee in your favour with RefNo. 10/08/0526
have both expired.
"
36
27.
ABC International Bank
informed Claimant of its understanding on this matter in a letter of December 29,
2015.
37 Thus, Claimant
was aware of ABC International Bank's position that both the fronting guarantee and the backing guarantee had
expired.
28.
Moreover, this position
was shared by Al Hani. In a letter it sent to HIB as far back as March 11, 2013, it referred to the Tajura
advance payment guarantee as having
expired.
38 This
understanding was also made clear in Claimant's submissions in the course of the proceedings and in statements
made by one of Claimant's witnesses.
29.
In its Reply, Claimant
states the following:
The Respondent in
its Counter-Memorial contends that Al Hani's failure to renew the advance payment guarantee, which had
lapsed, explains why the recommencement agreement for the Tajura
Contract was never agreed. The Respondent's position is misleading: the disagreement with the advance
payment guarantee was in the context of the negotiations with Gumhouria Bank, which refused to renegotiate
the interest that Al Hani was paying on its credit facility unless it re-established the guarantee which,
as Mr. Knaack explained in his first witness statement, Al Hani was unwilling to agree to renew while it
was still uncertain whether Al Hani could proceed with the
project.
39
30.
Claimant's assertion in
its Reply is borne out by the testimony of Mr. Knaack, the commercial manager of Al Hani. Mr. Knaack made it
clear that Al Hani understood the Tajura advance payment guarantee, including the backing guarantee between
Gumhouria Bank and ABC International Bank, to have expired:
At this time, I
also had a number of meetings with Gumhouria Bank. As I mentioned above, Al Hani had taken out a credit
facility with Gumhouria Bank in 2010 which we had exhausted, and I tried
to negotiate with the bank a moratorium on interest. However, our negotiations with Gumhouria Bank were
difficult since the bank would always insist that we agreed to renew the advance payment guarantee for the
Tajura contract.
The counter-guarantee between Gumhouria Bank and ABC Bank had expired due to an
administrative oversight and Gumhouria Bank tried to get us to agree to rectify this, which we refused to
do since it was still uncertain that we would be able to continue with the
project.
40
31.
Notwithstanding all of the
above, Claimant was charged by ABC International Bank and agreed to pay it fees for the backing
guarantee,
41 despite
ABC International Bank's clear belief, which Claimant shared, that both the fronting guarantee and the backing
guarantee relating to the advance payment under the Tajura contract had expired.
32.
The conclusions reached by
the majority with respect to the issues of the advance payments and the guarantees are untenable for the reasons
given below.
33.
First, the Tribunal unanimously observes that "the state of the Libyan courts remains
very critical,"
42 that
"Libyan courts are not a practicable and safe
option,"
43 and that
Claimant had "no viable mechanisms for settling disputes with the Libyan State entities involved . . . other
than resorting to Treaty
arbitration."
44 Yet,
when it comes to Respondent's request for set-off, the majority states that this is a "matter that must be
addressed by the Parties, ifit is to be addressed, outside the context of this
arbitration,"
45
without indicating in which forum. The practical implications of this distinction is that contractual claims,
insofar as they address Claimant's rights, are selectively elevated into treaty claims, while Respondent's
set-off requests arising from the same contractual relationship are denied similar treatment and are to be
addressed "outside the context of this arbitration" in a forum yet to be identified by Respondent.
34.
Having determined that it
had jurisdiction over Claimant's contractual claims, and having supplanted Libyan courts for the purpose of
deciding those claims, the Tribunal was under the obligation to comprehensively resolve the dispute, as Libyan
courts would have done. Consequently, it was incumbent on the Tribunal to rule on the issue of the advance
payments with a view to settling all amounts against all contracts.
35.
Respondent's proposition
that the amounts resulting from Claimant's claims for damage had to be set off against the unearned portions of
the advance payments finds support in Libyan law, which is the law applicable to the underlying contracts.
Article 184(1) of the Libyan Civil Code states: "Whoever receives, by way of payment, what is not owed to him
must return it." Similarly, Article 185 of the Libyan Civil Code
provides: "A payment which was not due may be recovered if it was made in the performance of an obligation whose
cause had not materialized or had ceased to exist." In the same vein, Article 349 of the Libyan Civil Code
(entitled "debts capable of setoff') allows the amount owed by a debtor to a creditor to be set off against the
amount owed by the creditor to the debtor. This is possible even when the claims do not arise from the same
source, i.e., if the claimant is seeking a claim under one contract and the respondent is seeking set-off for
overpaid funds under another contract.
36.
Second, the majority expresses concern regarding the "continued existence of the
unconditional and irrevocable guarantees created to secure the advance payments and other aspects of Al Hani's
performance."
46
37.
However, the evidence on
record from both Parties with respect to the advance payment guarantees is confusing and contradictory, and any
assertion that the Tajura guarantees (by far the most substantial ones) are still valid is speculative. It is
noteworthy that the majority gives undue weight to the testimony of one of Respondent's witnesses, Mr. Naas, in
relation to the Tajura bank guarantees, even though Respondent distanced itself from the testimony of Mr. Naas
in its letter to the Tribunal of November 15,
2019.
47 It is striking
that while the Award frequently casts doubts on Respondent's witnesses and their testimonies, qualifying them as
contradictory, inconsistent, or
unconvincing,
48 the
majority makes a positive assessment of the testimony of one of Respondent's witnesses on this particular issue.
38.
The majority posits that
it "could not apply the requested set-off without firm arrangements in place to assure that Claimant's exposure
under the guarantees would at the same time be reduced or ended to the extent of any
set-off."
49 It adds
that the Tribunal "has no authority to address this difficulty without the agreement of the
Parties."
50 Both
assertions are arguable.
39.
As indicated in the Award,
the drafters of the Austria-Libya BIT saw set-offs as lying within a tribunal's jurisdiction per Article 13 of
the treaty, and Respondent's claimed set-off can reasonably be viewed as an "incidental or additional claim" for
purposes of Article 47 of the ICSID's Arbitration (Additional Facility)
Rules.
51 The Tribunal
therefore has jurisdiction over the advance payment issue, irrespective of any
jurisdiction it has to rule on the bank guarantees. Even if all the bank guarantees were deemed still to be
valid and any decision on the advance payment were to be made conditional on the prior resolution of the issue
of the bank guarantees (which is the approach taken by the majority), it would have been possible to determine
the amount of the unearned portions of the advance payments and allow Respondent to proceed with set-off
only after releasing all the bank guarantees still in its possession. Alternatively,
Respondent could have been requested to provide evidence that the guarantees had been cleared prior to any
ruling on set-off.
40.
Third, while the majority stresses the necessary link between the advance payments and
the bank guarantees, it overlooks the obvious overlap between the advance payments and some of Claimant's claims
for damages.
41.
While Respondent and its
expert provide detailed figures for advance payments that they consider not yet to have been
earned,
52 Claimant
states vaguely, with little supporting documentation, that the full advance payments had been fully used up to
finance "significant costs that Strabag incurred upfront at the outset of the projects (for
example, in recruiting and mobilising personnel, constructing site facilities, purchasing equipment and
machinery, and engaging
sub-contractors)."
53
By its own admission, Claimant used unearned portions of the advance payments to buy equipment and supply the
joint venture with cash.
42.
The Tribunal nonetheless
awards Claimant compensation for some of the aforementioned up-front costs, including for lost or damaged
equipment and damages caused by delay. Without proper consideration of the issue of advance payments, it may
well turn out that the Award compensates Claimant for equipment and other costs that, by Claimant's own
admission, have already been covered using unearned portions of
the advance payments, i.e., monies from Respondent.
43.
As Respondent states in
its written submissions:
If the Tribunal
awards damages for loss of equipment as requested by Claimant without offsetting the unearned portions of
the Advance Payments, then Al-Hani would have received twice the value of the equipment: first by way of
damages and second by
means of the unearned retained Advance Payments. This double recovery is
impermissible.
54
44.
A task partially completed
may prove in practice to be more problematic than a task not initiated at all. The majority's decision to
summarily deny Respondent's requested
setoff
55 fails to
recognize that the issues of the advance payments, the bank guarantees, and Claimant's claims for damages are
intertwined and cannot be resolved separately.
This fragmentation is not conducive to "good order and fundamental
fairness,"
56 to which
the majority and indeed the entire Tribunal aspired.
[IMAGE UNAVAILABLE - SEE ORIGINAL PDF]
______________________________________
Professor Nassib G. Ziade
Arbitrator
Date: June 22, 2020